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Objective and Subjective Tests in the Law 
 




Across many subject areas, the law commonly attempts to distinguish 
between objective and subjective tests, and to assess the merits of objective as 
opposed to subjective legal tests.  This Article argues that all such efforts are 
fundamentally incoherent and ultimately futile in practice.  As demonstrated 
below, what the law takes to be objective in the relevant sense is essentially 
constituted by what the law takes to be subjective, and vice versa.  Judicial 
preoccupation with objective and subjective tests thus does no more than 
distract from more meaningful concerns.  Judicial attention should be directed 
away from this hopeless distinction, and instead focused on devising tests that 
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The law takes largely for granted that there are meaningful and important 
distinctions, in various contexts, between objective and subjective legal tests.  
The law tends to focus instead on endless controversies over when to apply a 
supposedly objective test, and when to apply a supposedly subjective test. 
                                                          
*  Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney 
School of Law. 
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Disputes over the merits of supposedly objective and subjective tests thus 
pervade the law.  Such disputes recur, for example, in various contractual, 
commercial, and business law contexts;1 in contexts of negligently, recklessly, 
or intentionally committed torts;2 in criminal law and sentencing contexts such 
as those involving probable cause, search and seizure, property forfeitures, 
entrapment, and death penalty eligibility;3 in Title VII employment 
discrimination cases;4 in Section 1983 qualified immunity cases;5 in numerous 
First Amendment contexts;6 and in cases involving a combination of allegedly 
ineffective assistance of counsel and defendant deportability.7   
Distinctions between objectivity and subjectivity in one sense or another 
are important in fields apart from the law, including, merely for example, 
probability theory,8 moral philosophy,9 and philosophy more generally.10  
Legal theorists as well have addressed issues regarding the meaning and proper 
scope of supposedly objective and subjective tests,11 usually with reference to 
what a presumed “reasonable person” or else some broad group, would or 
might think in a given situation.12 
But as it turns out, the case law should inspire skepticism as to the value—
and indeed the sheer coherence—of distinctions between supposedly objective 
                                                          
1  See infra Section I. 
2  See infra Section II. 
3  See infra Section II. 
4  See infra Section III. 
5  See infra Section III. 
6  See infra Section IV. 
7  See infra Section V. 
8  See, e.g., IAN HACKING, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND INDUCTIVE 
LOGIC 131 (2000) (describing the ideas of objective and subjective probabilities as 
“terrible terms, loaded with ideology”); John C. Harsanyi, Bayesian Decision Theory, 
Subjective and Objective Probabilities, and Acceptance of Empirical Hypotheses, 57 
SYNTHESE 341, 343–44 (1983) (describing subjective probabilities as referring to 
persons’ actual betting choices and objective probabilities as the “statistical behavior 
of a given physical system,” such as the frequencies of particular outcomes or 
tendencies).  See also Colin R. Blyth, Subjective vs. Objective Methods in Statistics, 
26 AM. STATISTICIAN 20 (1972) (contrasting objective values with “insights, 
intuitions, opinions, impressions, hunches, guesses, prejudices”).  Lawyers can 
attempt to utilize a similar distinction between objective and subjective probabilities 
in legal contexts.  See, e.g., Eric A. Johnson, Is the Idea of Objective Probability 
Incoherent?, 29 L. & PHIL. 419, 425 (2010) (distinguishing an actor’s subjective 
estimates of probabilities from probabilities drawn from “what the actor believed, 
knew, or should have known about the underlying facts”). 
9  See, e.g., STEPHEN DARWALL, PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS 19 (1998) (“[T]hat we 
take ourselves to be fallible and never fully able to transcend our own subjective 
standpoints is itself evidence of the objective purport of ethical opinions.”); HENRY 
SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 207 (Hackett 1981) (1907) (“[N]o act can be 
absolutely right . . . which is believed by the agent to be wrong.  Such an act we may 




                                                          
call ‘subjectively’ wrong, even though ‘objectively’ right.” (footnote omitted)); Dale 
Dorsey, Objective Morality, Subjective Morality, and the Explanatory Question, 6 J. 
ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 1, 2 (2012) (explaining that subjective views assess “the moral 
quality of actions in a way that is sensitive to agents’ epistemic circumstances,” 
whereas objective views do not). 
The approach to morality known as “ideal observer theory” ultimately involves 
some combination of purportedly objective and subjective perspectives.  See, e.g., 
Vernon J. Bourke, The Ethical Role of the Impartial Observer, 6 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 
279 (1978); Richard B. Brandt, The Definition of an ‘Ideal Observer’ Theory in Ethics, 
15 PHIL. & PHENOM. RES. 407 (1955); Roderick Firth, Ethical Absolutism and the 
Ideal Observer, 12 PHIL. & PHENOM. RES. 317 (1952).  See also classically, ADAM 
SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 16–30 (Economic Classics ed., 2013) 
(1759) (discussing the role of the “impartial spectator”). 
10  See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH 21 (1991) 
(regarding “objectivity” as supposedly transcending real or even imaginary groups); 
LORRAINE DASTON & PETER GALISON, OBJECTIVITY 379 (2010) (“All the multiple 
senses of objectivity intersect in their opposition to subjectivity”); SANDRA HARDING, 
OBJECTIVITY AND DIVERSITY:  ANOTHER LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH x (2015) 
(“[O]bjectivity ‘is not a single idea, but rather a sprawling collection of assumptions, 
attitudes, aspirations, and antipathies,’” and is at best “an essentially contested 
concept”). 
For a more substantive discussion, see NICHOLAS RESCHER, OBJECTIVITY:  THE 
OBLIGATIONS OF IMPARTIAL REASON 7 (1997) (“An objective judgment . . . abstracts 
from personal idiosyncrasies or group parochialisms.  It is a judgment made without 
the influence of individual or communal preferences and predilections.”); John 
McDowell, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, 67 PHIL. & PHENOM. RES. 675, 676 
(2003) (“This mutual intelligibility between ourselves and others requires us to 
conceive objective reality as common ground between ourselves and our interlocutors, 
potential and actual.”); V.J. McGill, Subjective and Objective Methods in Philosophy, 
41 J. PHIL. 421, 421 n.1 (1944) (“Data are ‘objective’ if observable by more than one 
person and ‘subjective’ when observable by only one.”). 
11  See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 31 (2009) (“[P]roperly understood, recklessness is a subjective 
concept that tracks the defendant’s assessment of the risk.”); KENT GREENAWALT, 
LAW AND OBJECTIVITY 93 (1995) (distinguishing objectivity as external, or as linked 
to reasonableness, from subjectivity as internal or personalized); MATTHEW KRAMER, 
OBJECTIVITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 3 (“Every variety of objectivity is opposed to a 
corresponding variety of subjectivity.”); id. at 94 (explaining one variety of objectivity 
as involving properties “whose nature can be fully specified without reference to 
certain actual or potential experiences in human beings”); Heidi Li Feldman, 
Objectivity in Legal Judgment, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1187, 1187 (1994) (“[M]any are 
ready to discontinue talk of objectivity altogether, on the grounds that it has been 
nothing more than a mask for the oppressive practices of politically and economically 
privileged groups, promising neutrality where in fact there are only power relations.”); 
David M. Paciocco, Subjective and Objective Standards of Fault For Offenses and 
Defenses, 59 SASK. L. REV. 271, 272 (1995) (“[T]he distinction [between objective 
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and subjective legal tests.  What is thought by the law to be subjective actually 
pervades and informs, in multiple ways, what is thought to be objective, and 
vice versa.  The objective and the subjective, in effect, unavoidably help define 
and comprise each other.  The law’s attempts, in various contexts, to 
differentiate or combine objective and subjective tests are thus inevitably 
fruitless.13 
Ultimately, the law should seek to avoid relying on these incoherent 
categories.  Instead, the law should strive to devise tests that ask precisely what 
to take into account, and precisely how to do so, in adopting rules and 
adjudicating cases.  The answers will vary according to context.  Crucially, 
though, all such answers must recognize any overriding constraints of fairness 
applied to the relevant parties, and then seek to enhance some version of an 
                                                          
and subjective fault] is not just important—it lies at the very heart of the debate about 
what we want criminal law to be.”). 
12  Interestingly, courts sometimes distinguish reasonable beliefs from broad 
community standards.  See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987) (assessing “value” 
and the application of “community standards” in the obscenity context); see also R.M. 
HARE, MORAL THINKING:  ITS LEVELS, METHOD AND POINT 210–11 (1981) (in the 
context of provocation, one sense of an objective test “asks whether a reasonable man 
would have been provoked”); SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 65 (1989) (linking 
what a presumably reasonable person would have believed to a subjective account of 
rightness); Lisa J. Bernt, Finding the Right Jobs For the Reasonable Person in 
Employment Law, 77 UMKC L. REV. 1, 1 (2008) (“Historically, courts have invoked 
the reasonable person when looking to set some ‘objective’ or universal (as opposed 
to ‘subjective’ or individualized) standard of conduct.”); Christopher Jackson, 
Reasonable Persons, Reasonable Circumstances, 50 SAN. DIEGO L. REV. 651, 655 
(2013) (in determining what counts as a legally relevant circumstance, “[t]he physical 
features of the situation will likely be included, while the particular peccadillos of the 
defendant probably will not”); Johnson, supra note 8, at 428 (“[T]he reasonable-
person construct is ‘indeterminate through and through.’” (quoting Larry Alexander, 
Inculpatory and Exculpatory Mistakes and the Fact/Law Distinction: An Essay in 
Memory of Myke Bayles12 L. & Phil. 33, 51 (1993))); Neil McCormick, 
Reasonableness and Objectivity, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1575, 1576 (1999) (linking 
the behavior of the reasonable person with “the common standards of the 
community”); Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 323 (2012); Peter Westen, Individualizing the Reasonable Person in Criminal 
Law, 2 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 137, 138 (2008) (“Reasonableness in criminal law is an 
objective standard; i.e., a standard that an actor’s conduct, mental states and/or 
emotions may or may not succeed in satisfying.”).   
13  The inescapable incoherence of any distinction between objective and 
subjective legal tests goes beyond the mutual dependence of the concepts involved.  
There is, for example, no full understanding of an even number without the idea of an 
odd number.  But that sort of mutual dependence is benign.  The even number versus 
odd number distinction is coherent in a way that the objective test versus subjective 
legal test distinction is not. 




overall well-being within those constraints.  The focus of legal tests should 
thus be on substance and procedure, as opposed to the hopelessly distracting 
labels of subjectivity and objectivity. 
In the end, one might try to replace futile quests for subjective or objective 
tests by aiming specifically at the attractive goal of promoting equality.  
Despite the constitutional and normative appeal of equality, however, taking 
this path would ultimately be inadvisable.  This is largely because even among 
persons of the greatest insight and benevolence, the idea of equality quickly 
fractures into a variety of more or less conflicting visions.  If any single 
underlying substantive aim can usefully, if imperfectly, inform legal decision-
making in the place of futilely pursuing supposedly objective and subjective 
tests, that aim may instead be the related idea of community.  While the idea 
of reasonably promoting community through law can take multiple forms, the 
direct conflicts among visions of community may be less stark and 
irreconcilable than those involving conflicting visions of equality. 
We seek to validate each of these basic claims gradually, cumulatively, 
and inductively, across various legal contexts, beginning immediately below. 
 
I. OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE TESTS IN CONTRACTUAL, COMMERCIAL, 
AND RELATED CASES 
 
The basic law of contract formation and interpretation introduces some 
considerations that are crucial for our purposes.  It is often suggested that 
interpretation of contracts is somehow a matter of discerning and giving effect 
to the mutual intent of the contracting parties.14  On a natural reading, this 
might suggest that contract law seeks somehow to appreciate the subjective, 
real, or genuine intent of the parties.  But courts are often quick to draw back 
from any such inquiry, focusing instead on what they apparently imagine to be 
an independent, more public, more determinate, more reasonableness-
oriented, and more standardized inquiry into supposedly objective 
considerations.15 
                                                          
14  See, e.g., Tribeca Companies, LLC v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 239 Cal. App. 
4th 1088, 1111 (2015) (“A contract must be interpreted so as to give effect to the 
mutual intent of the parties.” (quoting Winograd v. Am. Broad. Co., 68 Cal. App. 4th 
624, 632 (1998))). 
15  See id. (“The terms of a contract are determined by objective rather than 
subjective criteria.” (quoting Winograd, 68 Cal. App. 4th at 632)); Grant Cty. Port 
Dist. v. Wash. Tire Corp., 349 P.3d 889, 895 (Wash. 2015) (“Washington follows the 
objective manifestation theory of contracts, looking for the parties’ intent by its 
objective manifestations rather than by looking at the parties’ unexpressed subjective 
intent.” (quoting Paradiso v. Drake, 135 Wash. App. 329, 336 (2d Div. 2006))); 
Nicholas C. Dranias, Consideration as Contract: A Secular Natural Law of Contracts, 
12 TEX. REV. L. & POL’Y 267, 294 (2008) (“Under the objective theory, courts focus 
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Even if we take the “objective” approach at face value, cracks in the theory 
quickly begin to emerge.  An objective expression of intent is to be determined 
by what one contracting party “would,” on the basis of the other contracting 
party’s actions, tend to believe about that party’s intent.16  However, what 
somebody would believe is different than what somebody could, or even 
might, reasonably believe.  One can hardly claim that ordinary contractual 
language typically bears only one reasonable interpretation,17 such that a 
reasonable person relying on the contractual terms would be bound to one 
specific interpretation, rather than to a range of reasonable, but potentially 
conflicting, interpretations. 
Even more importantly, consider the subjectivities unavoidably involved 
in selecting, or describing, the reasonable contracting party (or some other 
reasonable interpreter of the contractual terms).  We must choose to describe 
that reasonable person’s circumstances, in one way or another.  Are we to start 
with the non-drafting party, impute reasonableness to that party in all relevant 
respects, and then discount or ignore any supposedly unreasonable qualities, 
biases, cognitive limits, values, priorities, quirks, or idiosyncrasies, whether 
previously known to either party or not?  Without attempting at this early point 
to resolve the question, we pause merely to note that the idea of a reasonable 
contracting party, no less than the idea of a reasonable18 or impartial19 
spectator, is massively indeterminate and undertheorized.  The idea of a 
reasonable contracting party is, with rich irony, largely subjective in more than 
one sense.  Let us also momentarily set aside questions of which circumstances 
involved in a case are relevant, weighty, controlling, or trivial. 
Contract cases20 and contract theorists21 thus not surprisingly often try to 
limit the dominance of any supposedly objective model of contract 
                                                          
on what a reasonable person in the position of the promisee would conclude another’s 
behavior meant.”). 
16  See Tribeca, 239 Cal. App. 4th at 111 (quoting Winograd v. American 
Broadcasting Co., 68 Cal. App. 4th at 632)); Dranias, supra note 15, at 294; Wayne 
Barnes, The Objective Theory of Contracts, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1119–20 (2008) 
(focusing on “external acts and manifestations” as distinct from “subjective, internal 
intention”). 
17  For a classic discussion, see WILLIAM EMPSON, SEVEN TYPES OF AMBIGUITY 
(1996 ed.) (1930). 
18  For a brief introduction to the reasonable person standard, see supra note 12 
and accompanying text. 
19  See supra note 9 and accompanying text.  
20  See, e.g., N.A.P.P. Realty Tr. v. CC Enters., 784 A.2d 1166, 1169 (N.H. 2001); 
Smith v. Boyd, 553 A.2d 131, 133 (R.I. 1989). 
21  See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Contract as Agreement, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
353, 354 (2007); Recent Case, Contracts—Mutual Assent, 40 HARV. L. REV. 645, 645 
(1927); see also Kabil Dev. Corp. v. Mignot, 566 P.2d 505, 508 (Or. 1977) (noting 




interpretation.  One court,22 for example, legitimizes both objective standards, 
which supposedly apply “external criteria”23 to the ascertaining of meaning, 
and subjective standards, which supposedly refer to “the state of mind of one 
or more parties to the agreement.”24  Another court explained that “subjective 
intent” is “indicative of objective intent,” and therefore “subjective intent may 
be one of the factors which comprises objective intent.”25  On such a view, 
curiously, we are assumed to know a party’s subjective, internal intent, and 
then use that knowledge to infer objective, external intent. 
Courts often adopt a supposedly more subjective approach to contract 
interpretation in so-called party-satisfaction cases, and even then with some 
crucial complications.  For example, a court may claim to apply a more 
subjective test where the key issue of contractual performance seems to be one 
of “fancy, taste, sensibility, and judgment,”26 but not where the contractual 
dispute focuses on “commercial value, operative or mechanical fitness, or 
quality.”27  Thus, apparently, matters of judgment are thought to be more 
subjective, whereas matters of quality are thought to tend to be more objective.  
This dichotomization raises obvious difficulties.  One might wonder, for 
example, whether a sports car’s performance is a matter of judgment or quality.  
Does such a question have a subjective or an objective character?  As this 
simple example illustrates, determining when a subjective test or an objective 
test is required is not as simple as these courts assume. 
Adding a further complication, the courts in party-satisfaction cases 
declare that reasonableness is irrelevant to subjective tests, but also that claims 
of party dissatisfaction as to performance are “limited . . . by the duty of good 
faith.”28  The duty of good faith, however, necessarily involves an element of 
reasonableness.29  Thus, in these cases, the courts re-introduce elements of 
purported objectivity into  supposedly subjective tests. 
The profound and inescapable murkiness of the distinction between 
objective and subjective tests is further illustrated in typical commercial law 
                                                          
that the originally objectively-minded Professor Arthur Corbin eventually concluded 
that an objective or subjective test, alone, cannot fully explain the law of contracts). 
22  See N.A.P.P. Realty Tr., 784 A.2d at 1169.  
23  Id. (quoting 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 31:1, at 256 (4th ed. 1999)). 
24  Id.  
25  Smith, 553 A.2d at 133. 
26  Crum v. April Corp., 62 P.3d 1039, 1040–41 (Colo. App. 2002) (quoting Mike 
Naughton Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 862 F. Supp. 264, 269 (D. Colo. 1994)). 
27  Id.  For a similar attempt at such a dichotomization, see AMFAC v. Waikiki 
Beachcomber Inv. Co., 829 P.2d 10, 23 (Haw. 1992). 
28  See Crum, 62 P.3d at 1041. 
29  For discussion of either the purported objectivity or subjectivity of “good faith” 
in various commercial contexts, despite the term’s apparent subjective focus, see infra 
note 30.   
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contexts.30  Consider, merely for example, a dispute over whether a particular 
defect in some good qualifies as a substantial defect, so as to justify a buyer’s 
revocation of acceptance.31  Many courts have concluded that such a legal 
determination involves supposedly “subjective and objective aspects.”32  One 
such court explained that “the subjective component of the test takes into 
consideration the particular buyer’s needs and expectations,” whereas, in 
                                                          
30  See, e.g., Choice Escrow & Land Title, LLC v. BancorpSouth Bank, 754 F.3d 
611, 622 (8th Cir. 2014) (observing that “good faith” in the commercial context has a 
[supposedly] subjective component of “honesty in fact” and a [supposedly] objective 
component of observing “reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing,” but failing 
to note that these labels could with some justification be reversed); State Bank of the 
Lakes v. Kansas Bankers Surety Co., 328 F.3d 906, 909 (7th Cir. 2003) (Easterbrook, 
J.) (positing that ‘“good faith’ usually establishes a subjective standard, while due care 
is objective.  Why write ‘in good faith’ if you mean ‘in the exercise of reasonable 
care?’” and thus declining to recognize purportedly objective elements in the former, 
or purportedly subjective elements in the latter); Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. 
Ford Motor Credit Co., 995 F.2d 1422, 1430 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that good faith is 
an “amorphous” concept); Schwegmann Bank & Trust Co. v. Simmons, 880 F.2d 838, 
841–42 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting conflict over whether “good faith” of a holder in due 
course focuses on “subjective or objective knowledge and conduct” and that “good 
faith” does not involve a duty to investigate unless “the circumstances [objectively] 
reveal a deliberate desire” to evade knowledge for [objectively] improper reasons); 
Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d 1220, 1224 (Ala. 1992) (interpreting 
UCC § 1-208 and reasoning, “[w]hile the debtor’s burden of proof may be difficult 
because the debtor must delve into the creditor’s state of mind, the burden is not 
impossible.  That is, the debtor may . . . establish lack of good faith by proving that 
the creditor did not have possession of the [relevant] information” and thus evidently 
proving the apparently inaccessibly subjective by the apparently objective); Wohlrabe 
v. Pownell, 307 N.W.2d 478, 483 (Minn. 1981) (“We have . . . discussed the good 
faith requirement in Article 3 as a subjective standard rather than an objective 
standard.”); Triffin v. Liccardi Ford, Inc., 10 A.3d 227, 229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2011) (“‘[A] holder in due course must satisfy both a subjective and objective test of 
good faith.’” (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Triffin v. Pomerantz Staffing 
Servs., 851 A.2d 100, 104 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004))); J.R. Hale Contracting 
Co. v. United N.M. Bank, 799 P.2d 581, 591 (N.M. 1990) (noting “honesty in fact is 
subjective and is concerned with the actual state of mind of the creditor,” but should 
be determined “on the facts and circumstances”); Tolbert v. First Nat’l Bank, 823 P.2d 
965, 970 (Or. 1991) (noting that the question of a bank’s good faith “should be decided 
by the reasonable contractual expectations of the parties,” thereby further blurring any 
possible objective test versus subjective test contrast in this context (emphasis in 
original)); R.R. Comm’n v. Gulf Energy Expl. Corp., 482 S.W.2d 559, 568 (Tex. 
2016) (referencing Black’s Law Dictionary as defining good faith as “a state of mind” 
involving “reasonable commercial standards”. 
31  See Kesner v. Lancaster, 378 S.E.2d 649, 654 (W. Va. 1989). 
32  Id. 




supposed contrast, “[t]he objective element focuses on the actual defects, 
which must not be trivial or insubstantial.”33 
Any such formulation may seem, on its face, sensible enough.  But as an 
attempt to coherently distinguish between a subjective and an objective 
consideration, this formula is unsuccessful.  Much of the point of referring to 
something as a “need,” as above, in typical contexts, is to distinguish a genuine 
need from a presumably more subjective “want” or “desire.”  In the human 
rights context, for example, the emphasis is often on objective, rather than 
subjective, aspects of needs and corresponding basic interests.34  And we can 
certainly imagine a judge interpreting the idea of needs in an apparently 
objective light (any judicial test formulation to the contrary).35 
Correspondingly, it is far from obvious that debates over whether a defect 
in a commercial good should be considered “trivial”36 or “insubstantial”37 
should count as objective,38 and not as subjective, in character.  Suppose, for 
example, the buyer of a used book reasonably anticipates no underlining or 
marginal comments therein.  It turns out that the book in question does have 
some underlining and marginal commentary, and is thus, we may assume, to 
some degree either subjectively or objectively defective.  We must now ask 
whether this defectiveness is trivial or insubstantial.  A court might imagine 
that such a question has an objectively-natured answer.39  But one could easily 
argue that this inquiry is actually largely subjective. 
Consider, for example, a law student who buys a used casebook.  This 
student prefers a relatively unmarked copy, but also, subjectively, values the 
yellow highlighting of case holdings by the previous owner.  Why isn’t the 
question of the possible “triviality” or “insubstantiality” of this defect largely 
subjective?  Suppose another buyer of a used book intends to present the used 
book to a third party in nearly pristine, unmarked condition, as a gift, with 
some emphasis thus on appearance and aesthetics.  If the defect in the good in 
such cases is judicially considered to be substantial, it is hardly so on grounds 
we would normally deem to be objective. 
The law thus winds up tying itself into verbal knots in seeking to 
meaningfully distinguish between objective and subjective tests in the 
commercial law area.  The presumably subjective quality of sheer honesty in 
belief and action and good faith actually involves an element of objective 
                                                          
33  Id. 
34  See, e.g., DAVID BRAYBROOKE, MEETING NEEDS (1987); Christian Bay, Needs, 
Wants, and Political Legitimacy, 1 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 241 (1968); Evan Simpson, The 
Priority of Needs Over Wants, 8 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 95 (1982). 
35  See Kesner, 378 S.E.2d at 654. 
36  Id.  
37  Id. 
38  Id. 
39  See id. 
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reasonableness,40 as one could act grossly and irresponsibly irrationally, but 
honestly and, in some sense, in good faith. 
Part of the explanation for the law’s incoherence in this respect may lie in 
a judicial belief that “[a] subjective good-faith inquiry injects uncertainty into 
the law of contracts and undermines one of the U.C.C.’s primary goals—to 
promote certainty and predictability in commercial transactions.”41  The 
problem here is that what courts think of as objective tests, based perhaps on 
what presumably reasonable persons would do under some, if not all, of the 
presumably relevant circumstances, are no more determinate or predictable in 
their outcomes than what courts think of as more subjective tests.  A 
supposedly objective reasonable person standard unavoidably involves not 
only certain subjectivities, but basic indeterminacies, as we further explore 
throughout the contexts considered below. 
 
II. OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE TESTS IN TORT AND CRIMINAL CASES 
 
The incoherence of the distinction between objective and subjective test 
reappears in tort and criminal law contexts.  It is common ground that in the 
crucial area of tort negligence, the courts have never settled upon either a 
supposedly objective or subjective test.  As one scholar explains, “[the 
question of] whether negligence should be defined objectively or subjectively 
arises repeatedly and has often been debated, [but] the issue has never been 
resolved.”42  This perpetually unresolved debate has been in evidence at least 
since the classic English hay rick fire case of Vaughan v. Menlove.43  Attempts 
to reach some sort of coherent middle ground on the issue are almost as 
longstanding.44 
                                                          
40  See, e.g., Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen’s Bank & Tr. Co., 713 S.W.2d 517, 533 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1986). 
41  Casserlie v. Shell Oil Co., 902 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ohio 2009) (internal citations 
omitted). 
42  Warren F. Schwartz, Objective and Subjective Standards of Negligence: 
Defining the Reasonable Person to Induce Optimal Care and Optimal Populations of 
Injurers and Victims, 78 GEO. L.J. 241, 241 (1989). 
43 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1827) (pitting standards of ordinary prudence and care 
against good faith action in accordance with the actor’s genuinely best, if somewhat 
limited, judgment). 
44  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Franklin Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 179 (1884) 
(Holmes, J.) (“[Generally,] a man’s liability for his acts is determined by their 
tendency under the circumstances known to him, and not by their tendency under all 
the circumstances actually affecting the result, whether known or unknown.”).  This 
mixed formulation omits the further alternative of supposedly objectively considering 
those circumstances that would have been known to a supposedly reasonable person, 
under some specified circumstances. 




At a moral or legal policy level, the subjective versus objective test conflict 
has often focused upon the opposing pulls of fairness to individual negligence 
tort defendants and the safety of negligence tort plaintiffs and the broader 
public.  To accommodate the very real—one might casually say, objective—
cognitive or physical limitations of particular negligence defendants would 
increase the risk of uncompensated injuries to innocent negligence plaintiffs.45  
Concern for reducing the latter risk, however, may violate the popular 
principle that “ought implies can,”46 in the sense that moral and legal 
requirements should not be imposed upon those persons who faultlessly cannot 
comply with the standard at issue.47 
Of course, cognitive and psychological limitations of negligence 
defendants are subjective in the sense that they pertain more directly to a 
specific individual.  They are less than fully subjective, though, in that what 
we normally take to be personal limitations actually reflect alterable social 
policies, social perceptions, priorities, and constructs.48  The limits on the 
mobility of a person using wheelchair technology are largely socially and 
legally constructed.49  But those same limitations on the part of negligence 
defendants are objective in the sense that they can be introduced to the legal 
processes through direct evidence.50  
What we think of as “a purely objective standard”51 in the negligence 
context may well actually aspire to no higher form of objectivity than that of a 
perhaps short-term political or cultural group dominance, or a community 
sentiment “crystallized by law.”52  The scope, and the degree of inclusiveness, 
of the most relevant dominant community in a given negligence case will of 
course vary.53  To the extent that the law requires reasonableness in negligence 
                                                          
45  See Schwartz, supra note 42, at 241. 
46  See, e.g., Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, ‘Ought’ Conversationally Implies ‘Can’, 
93 PHIL. REV. 250 (1984); Robert Stern, Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’ and Did Kant 
Think That It Did?, 16 UTILITAS 42 (2004); David Widerker, Frankfurt On ‘Ought 
Implies ‘Can’ and Alternative Possibilities, 51 ANALYSIS 222 (1991); Gideon Yaffe, 
‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, 59 ANALYSIS 218 
(1999). 
47  See Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 46. 
48  Warren A. Seavey, Negligence—Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
4 (1927). 
49  SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL 
REFLECTIONS ON DISABILITY 57 (1996). 
50  Id. 
51  Seavey, supra note 48, at 10. 
52  Id. 
53  Id. 
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cases, the law will thus again reflect the various supposedly subjective and 
objective elements of any such reasonableness standard.54 
These inseparabilities of supposedly objective and subjective tests recur in 
other tort and criminal law-related contexts.55  The idea of probable cause, for 
example, involves various entangled threads of supposedly more and less 
objective and subjective considerations.56  The Supreme Court declared in 
Davenpeck v. Alford that “[w]hether probable cause exists depends upon the 
reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer 
at the time of the arrest.”57  This principle already excludes considerations that 
any reasonable person would know, if those considerations were not actually 
known, perhaps for individualized or idiosyncratic reasons, to the arresting 
officer.58  
Yet the Court also broadly declared that “an arresting officer’s state of 
mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of 
probable cause.”59  The Court here assumed, dubiously, that what was actually 
known to, and sufficiently appreciated by, an arresting officer is always 
“objective.”60  But the law can hardly filter apparently subjective elements out 
of any such determination.61  The determination of whether probable cause 
exists therefore unavoidably partakes of purportedly objective and subjective 
elements. 
The related area of the entrapment defense to criminal accusations seems 
at first to involve a primarily subjective test.62  The Supreme Court in Hampton 
v. United States explicated that “the entrapment defense focuses on the intent 
or predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime.”63  In so saying, the 
                                                          
54  See id. at 4 (“[I]n attempting to classify [the negligence defendant’s] conduct 
as right or wrong, we necessarily carry into our judgment an indefinite amount of our 
mental equipment, including our own standards and our own will.”). 
55 See Davenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152–53 (2004); Vaughan v. Menlove, 
132 Eng. Rep. 490, 492 (1827). 
56  See Davenpeck, 543 U.S. at 152, 153. 
57  Id. at 152 (citing Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)).  For a similar 
mix of objective and subjective considerations, see A.M. ex rel. F.M. v. Holmes, 830 
F.3d 1123, 1138 (10th Cir. 2016). 
58  Davenpeck, 543 U.S. at 152 (citing Maryland, 540 U.S. at 371). 
59  Id. at 153 (citing Wren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 912–13 (1996)) 
(apparently focusing on motives or thought processes of arresting officers). 
60  Id. at 154. 
61  See, e.g., Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 398–99 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(“Probable cause is not evaluated . . . based upon ‘the facts as an omniscient observer 
would perceive them,’ but . . . by the facts ‘as they would have appeared to a reasonable 
person in the position of the arresting officer.’” (quoting Kelley v. Myler, 149 F.3d 
641, 646 (7th Cir. 1998))). 
62  Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488 (1976). 
63  Id. 




Court’s focus may be not so much on the objective versus subjective test 
distinction, but on distinguishing the defendant’s predisposition from the 
conduct, or misconduct, of government agents.64  The Court’s apparent focus 
on the workings of the defendant’s mind often may be intended in some 
relatively objective sense.65  But the Court reverts to literally subjectivist 
language in then concluding that entrapment arises “only when the 
government’s deception actually implants the criminal design in the mind of 
the defendant.”66  To call the entrapment defense either objective or subjective 
is thus at best useful in certain limited respects, while being fundamentally 
misleading in crucial respects. 
Thus here and elsewhere67 the courts continually fail to construct, or 
coherently distinguish between, objective and subjective tests.  Yet they 
endorse and relentlessly pursue such distinctions.68  
As it turns out, though, the incoherence of such attempted distinctions 
comes into play even more prominently in a variety of civil rights-related 
cases, as we briefly explore immediately below.69  
 
III. OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE TESTS IN CIVIL RIGHTS AND QUALIFIED 
IMMUNITY CASES 
 
It is well established in the federal law of employment discrimination that 
a plaintiff alleging hostile environment sexual harassment must satisfy both an 
                                                          
64  See id. at 488–89. 
65  As, roughly, in the oversimplified idea that supposedly “objective facts could 
be used to determine subjective [i.e., actual or objective] knowledge.”  In re Forfeiture 
of One 1970 Chevrolet Chevelle, 215 P.3d 166, 171 (Wash. 2009) (en banc) (holding 
that vehicles held not forfeitable due to owners’ lack of actual knowledge of criminal 
activities). 
66  Hampton, 425 U.S. at 489; see also United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 
(1973). 
67  Consider in particular the number of distinct senses of objectivity and 
subjectivity applicable to cases forbidding the execution of persons with (particular 
sorts or degrees of) intellectual disability.  For a start on this controversial area of law, 
see Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014) (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304, 321 (2002)) (“[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . forbid the execution 
of persons with intellectual disability . . . .”); Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 486–
87 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 2407 (2016) (citing Ex Parte 
Cathey, 451 S.W.3d 1, 10, 10 nn.22–23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)) (“[W]e have recently 
discussed the subjectivity surrounding the medical diagnosis of intellectual disability 
. . . .”). 
68  Joseph A. Colquitt, Rethinking Entrapment, 4 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1389, 1390 
(2004). 
69  See infra Section III. 
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objective and a subjective test.70  The Supreme Court has specified that “a 
sexually objectionable environment must be both objectively and subjectively 
offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one 
that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.”71 
The latter, assumedly subjective, element is obviously problematic on the 
broader merits.  By its logic, no woman who because of youth, inexperience, 
or any form of institutionalized socialization believed at the time that the 
harassment in question was to be accepted as normal can possibly prevail, 
regardless of how severe or pervasive the harassment was.  More illuminating 
for our purposes is the first, presumably objective, test element, which focuses 
on offensiveness, or hostility, or abusiveness as judged by “a reasonable 
person.”72  This offensiveness must be of a sort not merely that a reasonable 
person could feel, but that a reasonable person would feel.73  Taken literally, 
any degree of dispute among assumedly reasonable persons in this regard74 
would thus entirely undermine the plaintiff’s case. 
It has often been suggested, however, that the proper way to formulate this 
purportedly objective test is not in terms of the perspective of a reasonable 
person, but in terms of, in appropriate cases, a reasonable woman,75 or a 
reasonable victim76 of the harassment in question.  Under this point of view, 
the supposedly objective hostile environment test should focus on a 
purportedly “reasonable” person who bears any and all of the particular 
subjective qualities that the courts somehow take to be legally relevant under 
the circumstances of the case.77 
                                                          
70  See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787–88 (1998). 
71  Id. at 787 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993)). 
72  Id.  The “reasonable person” language is derived from Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.  
73  Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787; Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. 
74  See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (“We realize that 
there is a broad range of viewpoints among women as a group, but we believe that 
many women share common concerns which men do not necessarily share.”). 
75  See, e.g., id.  
76  See, e.g., id. at 878.  For a relevant discussion, see Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. 
Pierce, The Legal, Ethical, and Social Implications of the “Reasonable Woman” 
Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 773, 773 n.2 (1993).  
More broadly, see McGinest v. GTE Service Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1112 (9th Cir. 
2004) (“In order to survive summary judgment, McGinest must show . . . a genuinely 
factual dispute as to . . . whether a reasonable African-American man would find his 
workplace so objectively and subjectively racially hostile as to create an abusive 
working environment . . . .”).  In the context of the “unwelcomeness” element, see 
Larsa K. Ramsini, The Unwelcomeness Requirement in Sexual Harassment:  Choosing 
a Perspective and Incorporating the Effect of Supervisor-Subordinate Relations, 55 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1961, 1962–63 (2014) (noting the range and variety of 
perspectives available for potential judicial adoption). 
77 Adler & Pierce, supra note 76, at 776. 




Among the subjectivities associated with an abstract reasonable person 
standard is the risk that such a disembodied entity will lead courts to presume 
against, to underplay, or even to omit relevant circumstances, backgrounds, 
histories, relationships, expectations, and experiences in determining how such 
a person would react.78  It is possible to try to preserve some pretense of 
objectivity by declaring that the reasonable person standard should always take 
(objectively) proper account of all of the (objectively) relevant circumstances 
of the particular case, including elements of gender, race, migrant status, and 
any other relevant status.79  But all other concerns aside, this alternative 
preserves merely the most superficial, formalistic illusion of objectivity.  
In substance, the test must recognize that reasonable judgments of 
offensiveness often vary with the more individualized, group-based, relational, 
psychological, or otherwise relevant subjective qualities of both victims and 
harassers.  A particular verbal expression plainly need not be universally 
offensive to all reasonable hearers in order to come within the logic of the 
sexual harassment statute.  As in the case of classic “fighting words,”80 the 
same utterance at any given time and place could have more or less adverse 
associations for some reasonable hearers, minimal offensiveness to other 
reasonable hearers, and may have even overall positive associations, in some 
contexts, to yet other reasonable hearers.81 
Similarly dubious is the claim to an objective test for qualified immunity 
of personal defendants in Section 1983 actions.82  The Supreme Court rejected 
what it termed a subjective test in favor of a supposedly objective test for such 
qualified immunity in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.83  Harlow thus held that 
“government officials performing discretionary functions generally are 
                                                          
78  See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879 (“We adopt the perspective of a reasonable woman 
primarily because we believe that a sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be 
male-based and tends to systemically ignore the experiences of women.”).  For 
discussion, see Elizabeth L. Schoenfelt et al., Reasonable Person Versus Reasonable 
Woman: Does It Matter?, 10 J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 633, 669 (2002). 
79  See Christopher Jackson, Reasonable Persons, Reasonable Circumstances, 50 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 651, 654 (2013). 
80  See infra Section IV for the discussion of Chaplinsky-style fighting words. 
81  Note the subtle arguments with regard to what are most commonly, but not 
invariably, thought of as offensive ethnic slurs in the trademark case of Lee v. Tam, 
808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016). 
82  See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–19 (1982) (construing petitioners’ 
qualified immunity defenses in the context of various constitutional claim against 
federal officials, and explaining that its formulation would also apply to actions 
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against state officials). 
83 Id.; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987) (citing Harlow, 
457 U.S. at 819 for the proposition that whether an official protected by qualified 
immunity may be held personally liable for allegedly unlawful action turns on the 
objective reasonableness of the action). 
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shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.”84 
An objective test in this context would seem to imply that all else equal, 
the standard in, say, constitutionally unreasonable search cases should be the 
same for a specialist government legal advisor, a chief of police, an 
inexperienced police officer, a public utility meter reader, and a newly hired 
substitute public school teacher.85  For simplicity’s sake, we shall assume this 
to be consistently the case.86  It is possible to read the Court’s objective 
standard as instead focusing on a reasonable person in light of some or all of 
the various relevant particular circumstances and capabilities of the particular 
civil rights defendant.87  But this would ultimately deprive the test of any 
pretense to distinctive objectivity. 
The crucial element of subjectivity in the Court’s qualified immunity test 
relates to the classic “level of generality” problem,88 recognized by the Court 
itself in the case of Anderson v. Creighton.89  If the right in question is 
expressed as, say, a general right to due process, then a finding of a violation 
of that right will always preclude any defense of qualified immunity, since the 
                                                          
84  Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818–19; White v. Pauley, 137 S. Ct. 548, 557 (2017); 
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015); City of San Franciso v. Sheehan, 135 
S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015); Lisa R. Eskow & Kevin W. Cole, The Unqualified 
Paradoxes of Qualified Immunity, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 869, 919 (1998) (“The 
touchstone for qualified immunity is Harlow’s standard of ‘objective legal 
reasonableness.’”). 
85  For public school student strip search cases involving the pursuit of limited 
amounts of cash, see Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 2003); 
Jenkins ex rel. Hall v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 1997).  
Excessive force claims may explicitly draw upon somewhat more particularization, if 
not also upon elements of subjectivity.  See, e.g., Pauly v. White, 814 F.3d 1060, 1070 
(10th Cir. 2016) (“We review . . . claims of excessive force under a standard of 
objective reasonableness, judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the 
scene.”). 
86  We also set aside any subjectivities involved in determining whether the law 
can be clearly established in the absence of any cases from particular jurisdictions or 
levels.  For one possible approach, see Thomas, 323 F.3d at 955 (“[O]nly Supreme 
Court cases, Eleventh Circuit case law, and Georgia Supreme Court case law can 
‘clearly establish’ law in this circuit.”). 
87  Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 (“Nevertheless, if the official pleading the defense 
claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither knew nor should 
have known of the relevant legal standard, the defense should be sustained.”). 
88  For background discussion, see Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels 
of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990); see also the 
classic debate between Justices Scalia and Brennan in the paternal visitation rights 
case of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989). 
89  483 U.S. 635, 639–40 (1987). 




right to due process is so well established.90  Any government official should 
recognize at all times that due process violations are, of course, impermissible.  
But if the right in question is, at the other extreme, expressed at an unduly 
specific, particularized level—perhaps including named persons, days of the 
week, and what was consumed for breakfast—there will never be pre-existing 
case law sufficient to clearly establish the right in question.  
The classic level of generalities problem is thus typically characterized by 
(arguably arbitrary) choices among degrees of abstraction or concreteness in 
how a claim of right is to be analyzed, or more literally, in terms of degrees of 
generality or specificity of the rights claim at issue.91  Thus while it is doubtless 
good for the law to establish that unreasonable searches and seizures are 
prohibited, 92 this general rule does not tell us whether a strip search for 
missing money is unreasonable under particular circumstances.93  In deciding 
actual cases, we would need the guidance of at least somewhat more concrete, 
specific, contextualized formulations.  Anderson recognized this need for some 
degree of specific contextualized formulations of the right in question.94 
Inevitably, the most relevant concrete, specific, contextualized 
formulations of a right will import one degree or another of particularized 
subjectivity.95  Thus some physical searches of a public school student may be 
constitutionally permissible, at least in extreme cases, as when student safety 
is clearly and immediately implicated and the search seems superficial and 
inoffensive.96  But we would typically want to consider some elements of the 
apparent subjectivities of the student, or students, to be searched.  Could it 
matter whether the search is conducted by someone more or less well known 
to, or trusted by, the student being searched?  Could the lack of any previous 
experience of being publicly searched matter?  Could the degree of what one 
might call the maturity, sensitivity, vulnerability or the resilience of the 
persons being searched similarly matter?  Could the students’ personal sense 
of privacy, or the subjective value thereof, ever matter?  Or the degree of 
possible embarrassment, if not humiliation?97 
These presumably subjective considerations often factor into whether the 
general right against unreasonable searches has been violated and, as well, to 
whether the public official conducting the search—perhaps the student’s 
                                                          
90  Id. at 639.  
91  See id. 
92  See, e.g., supra note 89 and accompanying text; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
325, 333 (1985). 
93  See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
94  See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639–40 (“[I]n the light of pre-existing law the 
unlawfulness [of the official conduct] must be apparent.”). 
95  See id. 
96  See New Jersey, 469 U.S. at 341–43. 
97  See id. at 338–39. 
138       UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 16, No. 1 
 
teacher—ought to have recognized the right violation at issue.98  Thus again, 
even a legal rule that purports to reject subjectivity must, on its own logic, 
embrace and account for what the law takes to be subjective considerations.99  
And as it turns out, an equal and opposite form of this general incoherence is 
on display in some First Amendment cases, as we now briefly illustrate.100  
 
IV. OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE TESTS IN FIRST AMENDMENT-RELATED 
CASES 
 
As we have seen, the standard legal test for qualified immunity 
incoherently insists on what it considers objective, at the expense of what it 
takes to be subjective.101  As it turns out, the courts commit what amounts to 
an equal and opposite mistake in the constitutional defamation doctrine of 
actual malice, where a supposedly subjective test inescapably incorporates 
evidently more objective considerations.102  
Where the actual malice doctrine is applicable, it requires that the 
defamation plaintiff show that the statements at issue were made with either 
subjective reckless disregard of their falsity,103 “a high degree of awareness of 
. . . probable falsity,”104 or actual “serious doubts”105 as to the truth of the 
assertions at issue.  The actual malice test is thus thought to be subjective.106 
In practice, though, courts in actual malice cases do not routinely attempt 
to establish the existence and contents of “other minds.”107  A libel defendant’s 
claim of good faith is instead typically tested on the basis of what the courts 
would take to be more objective considerations.108 Such considerations could 
include, say, written evidence that the libel defendant simply concocted the 
                                                          
98  Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 375 (2009) (noting 
the need to consider the student’s “adolescent vulnerability” under the Fourth 
Amendment standard). 
99  Id. at 374–75 (2009). 
100  See infra Section IV. 
101  See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
102  See infra notes 108–12 and accompanying text. 
103  See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). 
104  See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991) 
(quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964)); see also Harte-Hanks 
Commc’n, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667 (1989). 
105  St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 733. 
106  Harte-Hanks Commc’n, Inc., 491 U.S. at 688; Young v. Gannett Satellite Info. 
Network, Inc., 734 F.3d 544, 547 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting id.). 
107  For a sense of some of the philosophical complications, see Alec Hyslop, Other 
Minds, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/other-minds [https://perma.cc/Q959-P9N8] (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2017).  
108 See Masson, 501 U.S. at 510. 




claim in the absence of any grounds or evidence,109 or on the basis of readily 
checkable but unchecked (false) claims,110 or the “inherently improbable”111 
nature of the claim, or other “obvious reasons to doubt”112 the claim in 
question.  Crucially, what a court takes to be inherently improbable or 
obviously dubious need not have actually appeared doubtful to the actual libel 
defendant in the course of that defendant’s presumably subjective thought 
processes.113 
In sharp contrast, the classic Chaplinsky test for what amounts to 
unprotected “fighting words”114 is officially thought to be objective, as 
opposed to subjective.115  The seminal case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 
explained that “the word ‘offensive’ is not to be defined in terms of what a 
particular addressee thinks,”116 but rather by “what men117 of common 
intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average118 
addressee to fight.”119 
The basic problem here is that fighting words are typically not addressed 
to average persons, or to persons who are otherwise unspecified and somehow 
deemed ordinary.  Victims of fighting words, and of hate speech more 
generally, are instead typically targeted specifically as members of one or more 
specific racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual minorities.120  The reaction to a 
group-specific epithet by targeted persons who do not identify at all with the 
verbally targeted group might take many forms, including various levels and 
degrees of disagreement and, certainly, understandable befuddlement.  But an 
otherwise meaningful fighting words doctrine that explicitly ignores 
subjective elements plainly fails of its evident purpose. 
                                                          
109  See St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732. 
110  See id. at 730. 
111  Id.; see also Tucker v. Fischbein, 237 F.3d 275, 284–85 (3d Cir. 2001). 
112  St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732; Murphy v. Bos. Herald, Inc., 865 N.E.2d 746, 753 
(Mass. 2007). 
113  Consider, classically, the psychological defense mechanisms catalogued in 
ANNA FREUD, THE EGO AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENSE (1936), as well as the rich 
variety of important subconscious cognitive biases discussed in DANIEL KAHNEMAN, 
THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2013). 
114  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572–74 (1942). 
115  See id. at 573. 
116  Id.  
117  Our point here would not be crucially affected by reformulating the test in terms 
of “persons” rather than “men,” however important such distinctions are in other 
contexts.  See supra Section III. 
118  “Average,” as distinct, presumably, from the addressee in all of his or her 
relevant subjectivity and particularity. 
119  Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.   
120 See, e.g., Crosby v. United States, No. 2:11-cr-00023-GZS, 2015 WL 1457430, 
at *9 (D. Mass. Mar. 30, 2015). 
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We can appreciate the Chaplinsky Court’s unwillingness to validate a 
violent physical retaliation that seems baseless, utterly unforeseeable, or 
hypersensitive.121  But a supposedly objective test focusing on a disembodied, 
abstract, nearly cultureless, and otherwise nondescript ordinary person implies 
the lack of any understandable emotional motive to immediately physically 
react (in many cases), and thus effectively abolishes the category of fighting 
words, even as it claims to validate that category.  If a fighting words doctrine 
is to make sense, it must instead take account, to one degree or another, of 
persons as they somehow relevantly are, including their own histories, 
affiliations, identities, aspirations, and presumed subjectivities. 
The attempt to distinguish between objective and subjective tests also 
arises implicitly in the free speech context of online “true threats.”122  For 
example, in Elonis v. United States,123 the Court addressed, without thoroughly 
resolving, whether mens rea was necessary to convict the defendant of making 
threatening online communications.124  Vacating the conviction, the Court 
observed that “[t]he jury was instructed that the Government need prove only 
that a reasonable person would regard Elonis’ communications as threats, and 
that was error.  Federal criminal liability does not turn solely on the results125 
of an act without considering the defendant’s mental state.”126 
The Court in Elonis thus evidently contrasted a reasonable third-person 
perspective with the communicator’s own mental state.  Consider, though, the 
reactions of any actual person being allegedly threatened.  A focus on the 
person allegedly being threatened raises problems akin to those referred to 
above in the Chaplinsky “fighting words context.”127  Specifically, which 
vulnerabilities or other qualities or characteristics of the person allegedly being 
threatened should be considered legally relevant and how they should be taken 
into account?  
Such inquiries bear upon the fundamental question of whether the speech 
at issue should be considered legally threatening or not.  Here again it is 
undoubtedly tempting for courts to seek some distinction between objective 
                                                          
121  Problems of assumed “hypersensitivity” of observers are also raised in the 
distinct first amendment context of Establishment Clause violations.  See, e.g., Capitol 
Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777–82 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (focusing on a hypothetical 
reasonable observer who is appropriately informed and reflects community or 
collective sentiments). 
122  See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2007 (2015). 
123  Id. 
124  See id. at 2013 (declining to decide whether a mens rea of reckless 
indifference—as distinct from specific intent to threaten—might suffice for liability). 
125  Or presumably, the merely likely results thereof. 
126  Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011, 2012 (citing Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 
246, 252 (1952)).   
127  See supra notes 94–101 and accompanying text. 




and subjective tests, or some combination thereof.  On the one hand, courts 
would want to avoid criminal or civil litigation over what we take to be plainly 
innocuous language that is only eccentrically, or irrationally, construed by a 
listener or reader to be threatening.  So, there must be limits to subjectivity in 
this sense. 
But on the other hand, as in the fighting words context,128 courts cannot 
plausibly impose a more or less abstract and disembodied person standard.  
What we think of as objectively threatening must inevitably involve some 
variable mixture of subjective elements.  A credible and immediate threat to 
remove a wheelchair ramp, for example, might be genuinely threatening, 
depending in part on whether the person addressed uses a wheelchair, her 
realistic alternatives, and her own values and priorities regarding the use of the 
wheelchair ramp in question. 
There is a sense in which even the particular circumstances in which some 
named addressee uses a wheelchair can be thought of as an objective matter.  
So can any particularized personal history between the relevant parties.  But 
the idea of genuine threateningness must at some point consider more 
evidently subjective considerations, including degrees of the addressee’s fear, 
stress level, apprehension, anxiety, psychological vulnerabilities, and 
resilience, along with the addressee’s values, priorities, and other qualities.  At 
some point, it becomes arbitrary, if not insensitive and unjust, to impose any 
detailed standardized template on the emotional responses of allegedly 
threatened parties.  Thus again, in the true threat cases, supposedly subjective 
and objective considerations unavoidably refer to and mutually incorporate 
and define one another.129 
 
V. A FINAL ILLUSTRATIVE CONTEXT: OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE TESTS 
IN THE DEPORTABILITY LEGAL ADVICE CASES 
 
                                                          
128 See supra notes 94–101 and accompanying text.  
129 For further discussion of Elonis and true threat issues generally, see Michael 
Pierce, Prosecuting Online Threats After Elonis, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 995 (2016); John 
Villasenor, Technology and the Role of Intent in Constitutionally Protected 
Expression, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 631, 652–53 (2016) (“A subjective standard 
requires a jury to get inside the mind of a defendant and evaluate intent.  By contrast, 
under an objective standard the speaker’s intent is irrelevant.  Instead, what matters is 
whether a reasonable person would understand the statement to convey an intent to 
inflict bodily harm.”); Jing Xun Quek, Elonis v. United States:  The Next Twelve Years, 
31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1109, 1109–10 (2016); Paul Crane, Note, “True Threats” 
and the Issue of Intent, 92 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1235–36 (2006) (presenting a detailed 
mainstream attempt to distinguish in general between objective and subjective tests); 
Leading Case, Federal Threats Statute—Mens Rea and the First Amendment—Elonis 
v. United States, 129 HARV. L. REV. 331 (2015). 
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A final130 perspective on the basic problem herein is available through the 
numerous cases addressing issues of the effective assistance of counsel in the 
deportation context.  These cases illustrate the “peeling an onion” 
complications involved in attempting, vainly, to arrive at either a genuinely 
objective or a genuinely subjective legal test, or a combination thereof. 
These cases typically require a showing of deficient performance by one’s 
attorney,131 along with a showing of prejudice.132  Prejudice to the client’s case 
must amount to at least “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, 
[the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 
going to trial.”133  The defendant must also show “that a decision to reject the 
plea bargain [and go to trial, thereby risking a longer sentence] would have 
been rational under the circumstances.”134 
The courts explicitly emphasize that this showing of legally sufficient 
causation and prejudice cannot involve a defendant’s mere declaration that had 
he been properly informed of the possible or likely deportation consequences 
of a conviction, he would have proceeded to trial.135  Such a “mere declaration” 
test is implicitly characterized by the courts as subjective, at least in the sense 
that the alternative test—one that considers the reasonableness of going to trial 
under the circumstances—is explicitly characterized as an objective test.136 
The rejected subjective test of prejudice involves not only a rejection of 
the defendant’s mere unsupported assertions as to what she would otherwise 
                                                          
130 The range of illustrative contexts is indefinite.  The current Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11 governing filed legal assertions and arguments, for example, is thought 
to be “objective” in character.  Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 
F.2d 1531, 1536 (9th Cir. 1986).  Yet, curiously, sanctions under Rule 11 may be 
imposed if a paper “is filed for an improper purpose.”  See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1); 
Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990) (en 
banc).  It is, at the very least, imaginable that inquiring into an attorney’s purposes 
involves a subjective element.  The intent in attempting to revise Rule 11 to reflect an 
objective standard may have been to thereby strengthen the rule.  See David J. Weber, 
Note, Rule 11:  Has the Objective Standard Transgressed the Adversary System?, 38 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 279, 279–83 (1987).  In general, though, there seems no obvious 
reason why supposedly objective tests, as of mere reasonableness, must be more 
stringent than supposedly subjective tests, which could presumably require either 
massive or trivial amounts of evidence.  Additionally, the Supreme Court’s claim that 
professional school student competency judgments are more “subjective” than typical 
student disciplinary investigations may itself be arbitrary.  See Bd. of Curators v. 
Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978). 
131 See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). 
132 Id. 
133 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 
134 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366–67 (2010). 
135 United States v. Batamula, 823 F.3d 237, 240 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Pilla v. 
United States, 668 F.3d 368, 373 (6th Cir. 2012)). 
136 See id. 




have chosen, but also a rejection of any possible relevance of any potential 
unlawfulness, “arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice, ‘nullification,’ and the like” on 
the part of a judge or jury,137 and even of the “idiosyncrasies”138 of any legal 
decisionmaker.  A defendant’s perhaps reasonable attempt to somehow factor 
in, say, the possibility of jury nullification or even jury sympathy is entirely 
ruled out in assessing the possibility of outcome-prejudice.  This of course 
ignores certain objectively relevant and perhaps even predictable possibilities. 
Part of the problem here is that in some cases, the idiosyncrasies of a legal 
decisionmaker, including the politics or proclivities of a judge, can be to one 
degree or another predictable, and thus a part of the defendant’s objective 
decisional environment.  And there can clearly be a difference between what 
a particular defendant, as she really is, clearly would have chosen, and what a 
hypothetical disembodied reasonable person in general might have chosen.139 
Inevitably, there will arise some tension between a legal test for causation 
or prejudice that rejects any consideration of an actor’s actual idiosyncrasy, in 
the name of objectivity,140 and, as the courts often hold, determines the 
prejudice issue under “the totality of the circumstances.”141  Inescapably, 
various considerations thought to involve particularities, quirks, dispositions, 
distinct priorities, values, idiosyncrasies, and even (known or suspected) 
eccentricities help to comprise the individual defendant’s actual 
circumstances, and thus the totality of the relevant and reasonably considered 
circumstances. 
The totality of the circumstances in the deportability cases thus must 
inevitably encompass subjective as well as objective considerations.  While 
statistical evidence may be relevant,142 so, certainly, may be what we normally 
think of as subjective or individualized143 evidence.  And so, crucially, may a 
defendant’s own idiosyncratic, perhaps even inexplicably intense, desire to run 
the risk of a somewhat longer prison sentence in order to even slightly increase 
the chances of entirely avoiding deportation.144  Thus, there is simply no 
                                                          
137 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984). 
138 See Hill, 474 U.S. at 60; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695; Batamula, 823 F.3d at 240.  
It would seem, though, that not all judicial idiosyncrasies, or all possible jury 
nullification cases, are equally unpredictable. 
139 See DeBartolo v. United States, 790 F.3d 775, 778 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting the 
possibility what what a defendant would have chosen might be different than what a 
reasonable person might have chosen). 
140 See supra notes 131 and 133. 
141 Batamula, 823 F.3d at 240 (quoting United States v. Kayode, 777 F.3d 719, 725 
(5th Cir. 2014)). 
142 See United States v. Rodriguez-Vega, 797 F.3d 781, 788 (9th Cir. 2015). 
143 Id. 
144 See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368 (2010) (“[P]reserving the 
client’s right to remain in the United States may be more important to the client than 
any potential jail time.” (internal quotations omitted)); Kovacs v. United States, 744 
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objectively reasonable and uniform tradeoff between prison time and the 
chances of not being deported.  The courts’ purportedly objective test of 
prejudice must inevitably take account, among other considerations, the 
relative intensity (however such intensity may be shown) of a particular 




The cumulative evidence from across several important areas of the law 
thus suggests that attempts to distinguish between objective and subjective 
legal tests must inevitably result in some form of incoherence.  All such efforts 
are in that sense futile.  To one degree or another they distract from more 
productive judicial activities, including devoting more and better judicial 
attention to the appropriate elements and goals of all legal tests. 
Courts should thus pay no further attention to attempting to devise or 
combine objective and subjective tests.  Rather, courts should focus on crafting 
judicial tests that crucially deliver at least minimally acceptable degrees of 
procedural and substantive fairness to all affected parties.  Beyond that 
fundamental constraint, courts should, within limits set by appropriate 
personal and institutional humility, and while respecting a sound constitutional 
division of labor, seek to genuinely promote the broader public well-being. 
One such approach to the latter challenge begins with a properly critical 
focus on the historically familiar reasonable person.146  In some respects, a 
reasonable person test can indeed affirmatively contribute to the important 
constitutional and moral value of the idea of equality.147  But in other respects, 
the familiar reasonable person test can itself also promote and legitimize 
inequality.148 
In the case of a victim subjected to workplace sexual harassment,149 and 
in fighting words and true threat cases, we can see how consciously replacing 
a literal reasonable man standard with a reasonable person standard might tend 
                                                          
F.3d 44, 52 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting the possibility of a particular defendant’s placing 
“particular emphasis” on the possibility of deportation when deciding whether or not 
to plead guilty). 
145 For further discussion of these issues, see Hernandez v. United States, 778 F.3d 
1230 (11th Cir. 2015); Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115 (2011); United States v. 
Akinsade, 686 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630 (3d 
Cir. 2011); State v. Cardenas, 61 N.E.3d 20 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016). 
146 See, e.g., Mayo Moran, The Reasonable Person: A Conceptual Biography in 
Comparative Perspective, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1233, 1271 (2010) [hereinafter 
Moran, The Reasonable Person]; Mayo Moran, Reasonable Person, in The New 
Oxford Companion to Law (2008).  
147 See Moran, The Reasonable Person, supra note 146, at 1233. 
148 See id. at 1233, 1276. 
149 See supra Section III. 




to alter the adjudicator’s tacit frame of reference in deciding the case in a way 
that promote equality. 
The problem, though, is that a formally neutral reasonable person standard 
may still implicitly incorporate and validate “presumptively male, white, able-
bodied, literate”150 baseline expectations and standards.151  It will typically still 
be possible for persons who do not embody these tacit baseline presumptions 
to seek to displace such presumptions by arguing for their inadequacy in any 
particular case.152  But such attempts to modify the purportedly neutral or 
presumed standard, so as to reasonably accommodate persons whose 
circumstances do not match those that are legally presumed, will be met with 
resistance.153  The risks of modifying implicitly presumed standards will thus 
be borne by those who do not fit implicit norms.154  Additionally, any argument 
for adjustment of a presumed baseline assumption in light of one’s own 
relevant actual qualities may seem, ironically, “like a plea for special 
treatment.”155 
These considerations suggest that reasonableness tests, whether they are 
thought of, however inadequately, as either objective or subjective, should, all 
else equal, aim at some appropriate promotion of equality values.  After all, 
equality, at least in some sense, is written into the Constitution,156 and into the 
broader legal system itself as a foundational value.157 
There are important limitations, however, to designing legal tests with an 
eye toward promoting equality, as opposed to fruitlessly pursuing some 
coherent parsing of supposedly objective or subjective considerations.  At a 
general policy-oriented level, the idea of equality has by now become 
massively indeterminate and widely varied in its basic concerns and 
requirements.158  The idea of equality, in itself, clearly tells us little.  Much of 
the value of many forms of equality may be instrumental in, or a means of, 
promoting other values. 
                                                          
150 Moran, The Reasonable Person, supra note 146, at 1276. 
151 See id. 
152 See id. 
153 See id. 
154 See id. 
155 Id.  For an alternatively focused emphasis on the goal of equality in the context 
of the negligence law reasonableness standard, see Avihay Dorfman, Reasonable 
Care: Equality as Objectivity, 31 L. & PHIL. 369 (2012). 
156 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (prohibiting states from denying “equal protection 
of the laws”). 
157 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF EQUALITY (2002) (arguing that the government should aim at a form of 
material equality). 
158 See generally R. George Wright, Equal Protection and the Idea of Equality, 34 
L. & INEQUALITY 1 (2016). 
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Some particular forms of equality, however, may promote what has been 
called the value of community, solidarity, or fraternity.159  The idea of 
promoting community has, for many, an intuitive and quite understandable 
appeal.  We of course cannot undertake a broad defense of the legal and moral 
value of community here.  But at the very least, we can point out that continued 
judicial obsession with pursuing objectivity or subjectivity offers no payoff.  
Rather than futilely pursuing the crafting of supposedly objective or subjective 
legal tests, or focusing unduly on the idea of equality itself, courts should 
instead seek, again within the constraints of fairness, to appropriately promote 
forms of basic community160 that are themselves linked to some forms of 
equality. 
                                                          
159 See, e.g., G.A. COHEN, RESCUING JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 32 n.9 (2008); DAVID 
HOLLENBACH, THE COMMON GOOD AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 202 (2002) (“Poor people 
who are unemployed, inadequately housed, and undereducated in American cities are 
not part of a society that can be called a commonwealth.”); Elizabeth S. Anderson, 
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Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1989); Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
Friendship and Solidarity, 39 RES. IN PHENOMENOLOGY 3, 11 (1989) (“Our 
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